Unit 5 Decisions

CASE 1 – ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE - TERRY (a traffic stop that finds other criminal evidence, evidence must be visible to the officer - cannot be in trunk for instance, or if an occupant of the vehicle indicates criminal evidence is in the car) STOP – INFORMATION PROVIDED TO A POLICE OFFICER IN PERSON BY AN INFORMANT, PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN TO THE OFFICER, CONCERNING THE IDENTITY AND WHEREABOUTS OF A PERPETRATOR OF A CRIME WITNESSED BY THE INFORMANT WAS ENOUGH TO GIVE THE POLICE OFFICER A REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW THE OFFICER TO DETAIN THE PERSON IDENTIFIED BY THE INFORMANT EVEN THOUGH, AT THE TIME OF THE SUPPRESSION HEARING, THE POLICE OFFICER STILL DID NOT KNOW THE IDENTITY OF THE INFORMANT.

What is the issue here?_____________________________________

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Facts: On September 21, 2002, a stranger approached off-duty Police Officer Anthony Knox in a 7-Eleven store in Bladensburg, Maryland. The “extremely nervous” man told Officer Knox that he had just witnessed a high speed car chase and that the driver of one of the vehicles displayed a handgun out the car window. The informant said that one of the cars involved in the chase was in the 7-Eleven parking lot. He also pointed to Elohim Cross (appellant), who was speaking on a pay phone, as the person who had displayed the weapon and drove the vehicle.

Officer Knox informed the Bladensburg Police Department of the tip, and Officers Russell Chick, Shawn Morder, and Corporal Charles Cowling reported to the scene. After observing appellant for several minutes while he spoke on the phone, the three officers approached him as he was about to enter his car. An officer ordered appellant to “put his hands on his head and walk away from the vehicle”; the officer then performed “a Terry stop patdown” as appellant was being handcuffed. While doing this, Officer Chick explained to the appellant that he was “being detained while we investigated the report of a firearm.” The patdown resulted in the discovery of no weapons.

Officer Morder and Corporal Cowling then searched the interior of appellant’s vehicle while appellant was asked some “background questions” by Officer Chick. During the search, Officer Morder observed a handgun through a space in the “partially opened” glove compartment. Corporal Cowling took a key to the glove compartment from appellant. In the glove compartment he found a handgun. The officer next found narcotics and money. The police then searched the trunk of appellant’s vehicle, where they found more drugs along with drug paraphernalia. The drugs field tested positive for cocaine.

Appellant’s counsel moved to suppress the gun and drugs found in the glove compartment, as well as the evidence obtained from the trunk. The motions judge denied Cross’s motion to suppress.

Appellant ultimately was convicted of second-degree assault. He appealed the motion judge’s denial of the motions to suppress the gun and drugs and paraphernalia, arguing that the warrantless search of the glove compartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

Held: Affirmed. The Court did not reach the issue of whether probable cause existed for the warrantless search of appellant’s vehicle. Based on the fact that appellant’s pre-arrest detention was brief, that he was not transferred to another location, and that he was told why he was being detained, the Court held that the appellant was not arrested prior to the search. Because the initial search was limited to the area in the vehicle where a weapon was likely to be found and the officers had reason to believe the suspect was dangerous, the search came within the scope of a search permitted by Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) – sometimes referred to as a “Terry-frisk” of an automobile.

The Court addressed the question of whether the police officers who searched the car had, prior to the search, a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the car contained a weapon and that appellant was dangerous. Although none of the officers who testified knew the informant’s name or address, there was no evidence that the informant tried to conceal his identity or that he would have been unavailable for further questioning if the officers wanted to obtain his identity. These factors, in addition to the fact that the informant approached Officer Knox in person and appeared to Knox to be credible, made “the likelihood that the information was reliable [] much greater than if the information had been obtained from a truly anonymous tipster.” Under all the circumstances, at the time the glove compartment was searched, the police officers had a reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was dangerous and that his car contained a gun. Thus, under the principles first enunciated in Terry, the Court held that the search did not violate appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

1. Review  what is meant by a “Terry Stop”

2. Who is the plaintiff, who is the defendant?

3. If you were the judge what would you decide, in favor the plaintiff or the defendant?

4. Would any of the cases in the worksheets apply a precedent?

Case 2 - CRIMINAL LAW - CAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING - ILLEGAL SENTENCE - MOTION TO CORRECT - USE OF STATISTICAL SURVEY

Facts: In 1992, Petitioner was convicted of, among other crimes, first-degree murder and sentenced to death. In a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence filed in 2004 under Maryland Rule 4-345(a), which gave rise to the instant case, he argued that his death sentence was imposed in a racially-biased manner. Petitioner is African-American and the victim of his crimes was Caucasian. Petitioner alleged that the death penalty was sought more frequently in such situations statewide and in Baltimore County where the crimes were committed than in other racial combinations of accused and victim. He also claimed the sentence was geographically-biased. Petitioner asserted that the State's Attorney for Baltimore County, who elected to pursue the death penalty and whose office prosecuted the case against him, sought such punishment in eligible cases more frequently than state's attorneys for other Maryland jurisdictions.

What is the issue here?_____________________________________

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To support the alleged constitutional errors under the federal Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment (and their Maryland constitutional analogues), Petitioner relied principally on an assertedly empirical, government-sponsored statistical study of Maryland's implementation between 1978 and 1999 of its death penalty statute, released publicly in early 2003 and published formally in 2004. The Circuit Court for Harford County denied the Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Held: Affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court on the basis that Maryland law interpreting what grounds are permitted to be raised as to the illegality of a sentence in a Rule 4-345(a) motion does not contemplate a statistical study as a qualifying predicate. Grounds for illegality of a sentence are those that inhere in the sentence itself, i.e., the sentence was illegal or should not have been imposed. A general statistical study of death-eligible case patterns, such as was offered here, did not demonstrate, or tend to demonstrate, that the specific death sentence in the Petitioner's case was illegal on its face. Moreover, Petitioner's motion failed to come within a recent exception, the so-called constitutional exception, to Rule 4-345(a) jurisprudence. With regard to this exception, the Court recently recognized that a defendant could seek relief via a motion under the Rule if he/she argued novel constitutional arguments that arose from decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals of Maryland in an unrelated case or cases decided after imposition of the death sentence on the defendant/movant. Petitioner's motion here did not come within this exception. Finally, the Court declined to recognize any further exception to embrace a generalized statistical study as a predicate for arguing illegality of a specific sentence.

Wesley Eugene Baker v. State, No. 132, September Term, 2004, filed October 3, 2005. Opinion by Harrell, J.

1.  what is the racial issue cited in this appeal?

2. Who is the plaintiff, who is the defendant?

3. If you were the judge what would you decide, in favor the plaintiff or the defendant?

4. Would any of the cases in the worksheets apply a precedent?

 FAMILY LAW - APPEALS – PERMANENCY PLANNING HEARING.

1. Facts: Mary S., Jessica W., Billy W., and George B. are the children of Tammy B. The father of Mary S., Jessica W., and Billy W. is deceased and the father of George B. is Michael B., Tammy B.’s husband, from whom she is now separated. All four children resided with both Tammy B. and Michael B. prior to the parents’ separation. The family first came to the attention of the Baltimore County Department of Social Services (DSS) when Mary S., then eight years old, alleged that she had been sexually abused by Michael B., who was later charged and convicted. All of the children remained in Tammy B.’s care and during the next two years DSS investigated four additional allegations of abuse and neglect, including allegations that Mary S. had sexually abused Billy W.

On February 7, 2002, DSS removed all four children from Tammy B.’s care, placed them under emergency shelter care, and subsequently filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County requesting judicial approval of shelter care for the children. The court ordered DSS custody of the children, and shelter care for them, pending an adjudicatory hearing. Thereafter, during the adjudicatory hearing, all four children were declared to be children in need of assistance (CINA) and committed to the care and custody of DSS for placement in foster care. The court also established permanency plans of reunification with Tammy B.

What is the issue here?_____________________________________

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Initially, DSS placed Billy W. and George B. together in a foster home; however, both boys were removed due to allegations that Billy W. had sexually abused a younger child in the home. After a brief stay in another home, Billy W. was committed to a residential treatment center, from June 2002 until November 2003, when DSS transferred him to a therapeutic foster home. During that same time George B. was moved to another foster home where he has remained.

Mary S. and Jessica W. were placed together in a foster home; after six weeks both were moved to a therapeutic foster home. In August 2002, Mary S. was admitted to Sheppard Pratt Hospital for suicidal behavior, where she was diagnosed with “aggressive disorder recurrent with psychosis” and “possible dissociative disorder.” Mary S. stayed at Sheppard Pratt for six weeks, was discharged and moved to transitional housing, and then to the Villa Maria Residential Treatment Center for six months, before returning to the original therapeutic foster home in May 2003. Jessica W. has remained in the original therapeutic foster home the entire time.

On June 23, 2003, DSS recommended, and the court ordered, a change in the permanency plan for George B. from reunification to a concurrent plan of reunification with Tammy B. and adoption. The court also increased Billy W., Jessica W., and Mary S.’s visitation with Tammy B. to include one additional hour of unsupervised visitation and maintained the same plans of reunification with Tammy B. for the three children. Tammy B. did not object to the maintenance of the permanency plans for Billy W., Jessica W. or Mary S., but contested the change in the permanency plan for George B. and noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. While that appeal was pending in the Court of Special Appeals, the Circuit Court held another six month review hearing on November 10, 2003.

During the review hearing, DSS filed a report addressing the status of each child and Tammy B.’s efforts to comply with various service agreements, to which Tammy B. objected on hearsay grounds, which was overruled by the court. In addition, DSS produced its only witness, the foster care worker, Ms. Kristy Caceres, who testified about the current status of each child and the interactions among Tammy B. and the children. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court continued the commitment of all four children to the care and custody of DSS, and the permanency plans for Billy W., Jessica W., and Mary S., as reunification with Tammy B. The court also ordered that Tammy B.’s visitation with Billy W. and Jessica W. would remain two hours supervised per week and one hour unsupervised per week. As to Mary S., the parties agreed and the court acquiesced in the decision that Tammy B. would be permitted one hour supervised visitation per week with Mary S. and that the unsupervised visitation would be suspended. Tammy B.’s visitation with George B. continued to be three hours of visitation with George B., but the supervised visitation was reduced to one and a half hours per week. In addition, the court ordered that the permanency plan for George B. should remain a concurrent plan of reunification with Tammy B. and adoption.

Both Tammy B. and Michael B. noted separate appeals to the Court of Special Appeals concerning all of the children with respect to the admissibility of hearsay testimony during the hearing, and from the court’s order regarding George B. In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court addressed the substantive issues raised by the parties and affirmed the judgments of the Circuit Court.

Held: To be an appealable interlocutory order, an order maintaining extant permanency plans either must operate to deprive the parent of the care and custody of the child or change the terms of the parent’s care and custody of the child to the parent’s detriment. Because the trial court did not change the permanency plans for the children to deprive Tammy B. of her right to care and custody of her children or alter the terms of her access to the children, Tammy B.’s fundamental rights were not implicated. Therefore, the trial court’s orders related to the permanency plans for all of the children were not appealable final judgments or interlocutory orders, which precludes review of the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay testimony during the permanency planning review hearing. Thus, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was vacated.

In re Billy W., Jessica W., Mary S., and George W., No. 92, Sept. Term 2004, filed May 11, 2005. Opinion by Battaglia, J.

1. Find out what is meant by an interlocutory order?

2. Who is the plaintiff, who is the defendant?

3. If you were the judge what would you decide, in favor the plaintiff or the defendant?

4. Would any of the cases in the worksheets apply a precedent?